California, Arizona, and several other states have recently legalized medical marijuana. My goal in this paper is to demonstrate that even if one grants the opponents of legalization many of their contentious assumptions, the federal government is still obligated to take several specific steps toward the legalization of medical marijuana. I defend this claim against a variety of objections, including the claims: that marijuana is unsafe, that marijuana cannot be adequately tested or produced as a drug, that the availability of (...) synthetic THC makes marijuana superfluous, and especially that legalizing medical marijuana will increase recreational use by ‘sending the wrong message ’. I then go on to argue that given the intransigent position of the federal government on this issue, state governments are justified in unilaterally legalizing medical marijuana as an act of civil disobedience. A large portion of this paper consists of an extensive response to the objection that legalizing medical marijuana will ‘send the wrong message ’– which I take to be the primary impediment to legalization. This objection basically claims that the consequences of withholding legalization (especially preventing increased recreational use) are superior to those of legalizing medical marijuana. I argue that legalization is justified even if one were to grant both that the harms of legalization outweighed its benefits and that utilitarianism is true. This requires a subtle and somewhat extended discussion of utilitarian moral and political theory. (shrink)

An adequate moral theory must provide for cooperation and trust between moral agents, but a tension exists between cooperating and maximizing. This tension is prominent in utilitarianism and contractarianism . Various puzzles illustrate this tension, and both utilitarians and contractarians must solve these to present a coherent moral theory. These puzzles include new and resilient versions of classic objections to utilitarianism, such as the claims that utilitarian agents cannot be trusted to keep promises and cannot take rights seriously. They also (...) include the contractarian puzzle of why rational agents would cooperate by making and keeping impartial contracts. In solving these problems, utilitarians and contractarians alike must choose between traditional and revisionary maximizing theories. ;In light of these problems: David Gauthier urges contractarians to appeal to a revisionary theory of rationality, Donald Regan has developed a new variety of utilitarianism, and many other theorists still argue for the revisionary theory of rule utilitarianism. These people underestimate the potential of traditional theories. Although traditional theories like act utilitarianism look only to the future--while revisionary theories sometimes take prior acts such as promises, deliberations, and intentions to justify action--traditional theories are still able to solve these puzzles and furnish a satisfactory account of cooperation and trust. Surprisingly, even though these puzzles were developed as objections to the traditional theories and the revisionist theories were designed to deal with these puzzles, the traditional theories provide superior solutions. ;This defense of traditional theories has broad implications in philosophy and elsewhere, but I specifically discuss two significant implications for modern moral theory and two implications for applied ethics. I reject the criticism that act utilitarianism fails on its own terms and argue that it has previously unnoticed advantages over rule utilitarianism. I also reformulate Gauthier's moral theory using the traditional theory of rationality, thereby answering a major criticism of his theory. In addition, I apply my understanding of traditional maximizing theories to the utilitarian theory of rights and then to the strategic problems of nuclear deterrence and of threats in general. (shrink)

Moral theorists and game theorists are both interested in situations where rational agents are to constrain their future actions and co-operate with others instead of being free riders. These theorists have constructed a variety of hypothetical games which illuminate this problem of constraint. In this paper, I draw a distinction between like the Newcomb paradox and like Kavka's toxin puzzle, a prisoner's dilemma and Parfit's hitchhiker example. I then employ this distinction to argue that agents who subscribe to the orthodox (...) theory of rationality do significantly better in disposition games than those who subscribe to revisionist theories like David Gauthier's, while revisionist agents do marginally better in behaviour games. I argue that because of agents' ability to manipulate their own weakness of will, orthodox agents do better at all of these games than has previously been thought. And, by elucidating the distinction between behaviour games and disposition games, I uncover the virtues that underlie the success of each theory of rationality. (shrink)